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Spatial navigation is a fascinating behavior that is essential for our everyday lives. It
involves nearly all sensory systems, it requires numerous parallel computations, and it
engages multiple memory systems. One of the key problems in this field pertains to
the question of reference frames: spatial information such as direction or distance can
be coded egocentrically—relative to an observer—or allocentrically—in a reference frame
independent of the observer. While many studies have associated striatal and parietal
circuits with egocentric coding and entorhinal/hippocampal circuits with allocentric coding,
this strict dissociation is not in line with a growing body of experimental data. In this review,
we discuss some of the problems that can arise when studying the neural mechanisms
that are presumed to support different spatial reference frames. We argue that the
scale of space in which a navigation task takes place plays a crucial role in determining
the processes that are being recruited. This has important implications, particularly for
the inferences that can be made from animal studies in small scale space about the
neural mechanisms supporting human spatial navigation in large (environmental) spaces.
Furthermore, we argue that many of the commonly used tasks to study spatial navigation
and the underlying neuronal mechanisms involve different types of reference frames,
which can complicate the interpretation of neurophysiological data.
Keywords: spatial navigation, hippocampus, vista space, environmental space, reference frames, allocentric and
egocentric representation
INTRODUCTION
A central issue in the cognitive neuroscience of spatial naviga-
tion pertains to the question of reference frames. Ever since the
discovery of place cells in the rodent hippocampus (O’Keefe and
Dostrovsky, 1971), this structure has been thought to provide an
allocentric description of the environment. In contrast, cortical
regions such as posterior parietal cortex or the striatum have been
linked to processing spatial information in various egocentric
reference frames. Even though the terms “egocentric” and “allo-
centric” appear frequently in manuscripts on spatial navigation,
their precise meaning is often not described. In addition, different
authors have different interpretations, which can lead to confu-
sion about what exactly is meant by an allocentric neural code,
for example.
In this review, our aim is to highlight some of the prob-
lems that can arise when studying the neural mechanisms that
are presumed to support different spatial reference frames. In
particular, we show that many of the commonly used tasks
involve different types of reference frames, which can complicate
the interpretation of neurophysiological data gathered in such
situations. In addition, we discuss how the scale of space in
which a navigation task takes place determines the processes
that are being recruited, which has important implications, for
example, for the inferences that can be made from animal
studies about the neural mechanisms supporting human spatial
navigation.
BACKGROUND
EGOCENTRIC VS. ALLOCENTRIC REFERENCE SYSTEM
To begin, we will provide a definition of what characterizes an
egocentric vs. an allocentric spatial code. Exceptions notwith-
standing, there is general agreement that in an egocentric
reference frame, locations are represented with respect to the par-
ticular perspective of an observer. As shown in Figure 1, the origin
of the egocentric reference system is centered on the observer, and
its orientation is defined by the observer’s heading. Importantly,
the brain entertains multiple egocentric reference frames that
are anchored to different body parts (i.e., eye-centered, head-
centered, trunk-centered), hence the orientation of an egocentric
reference system is determined by the orientation of the specific
body part.
For the sake of simplicity, let us assume that all body parts
are orientated in the same direction, hence the observer’s heading
coincides with the orientation of all egocentric reference frames.
Assuming a polar coordinate system, the egocentric position of
an external object can now be specified as follows: the length of
the vector connecting the observer and the object is the egocentric
distance of the object, and the angle between the observer’s
heading and that vector specifies its egocentric direction. However,
egocentric direction can also specify the direction between two
external objects, in this case it refers to the angle between the
direction of the observer’s heading and the vector connecting the
two objects.
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In contrast to observer dependent egocentric reference
systems, an allocentric reference frame specifies an object’s
position within a framework external to the observer and
independent of its position and orientation. Assuming a polar
coordinate system, an object’s allocentric distance corresponds
to the length of a vector connecting the origin of the coordinate
system and the object, and the angle between the allocentric
reference direction and that vector specifies its allocentric
direction. However, most environments do not provide a
meaningful reference point that could serve as an unambiguous
origin for an allocentric coordinate system. As a consequence,
allocentric distance of an object is rarely defined with respect to
an origin but rather with respect to other, behaviorally relevant
objects in the environment. Similarly, allocentric direction usually
specifies the direction between two external objects, defined
as the angle between an allocentric reference direction and the
vector connecting the two objects (Figure 1).
From these definitions, it is obvious that one major difference
between egocentric and allocentric representations pertains to
what happens when the observer moves about in the environ-
ment. For example, if the observer simply turns around, an
object’s egocentric direction changes, but its egocentric distance
remains the same. In contrast, neither allocentric distance nor
directions are affected by observer rotation. The differences are
even more pronounced for translational movements, for which
both egocentric distance and direction change, whereas their
allocentric counterparts remain unaffected. It is this observer
independence that makes allocentric representations an attractive
format for long-term memory representations: when the observer
moves about in a familiar environment, planning any navigational
step from an egocentric representation would require that one
continuously updates the egocentric vectors towards all potential
goals. In contrast, in an allocentric representation, all the observer
needs to do is to update their own allocentric position, because
this knowledge allows for computing egocentric distance and
direction towards other objects from any vantage point.
There is, however, one major problem that is rarely addressed
in the literature: what does an allocentric reference system actually
look like? While an egocentric reference system can be easily
defined in any situation where an observer is present, this is much
harder for allocentric reference frames. Imagine, for example, an
observer walking around on famous St. Peter’s Square in Rome,
which has an oval shape. In this situation, it is not at all obvious
what would define the orientation of an allocentric reference
system. Moreover, while the observer might try to extract the
major axes of the square and use those to define orientation, the
situation becomes even more ambiguous when the observer leaves
the square and strolls around one of the neighboring streets whose
orientation changes as one walks along. Is the initial orientation
of the allocentric representation still used or is a new one adopted?
And what factors determine whether or not a switch to a new
direction occurs?
SCALES OF SPACE
When considering the kind of reference frames associated with
different navigation tasks or paradigms it is important to consider
the scale of space in which these tasks take place. Montello
distinguishes between four classes of psychological spaces: figural,
FIGURE 1 | Egocentric and allocentric relationships.
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vista, environmental and geographical space (Montello, 1993).
While figural space (e.g., the space of pictures or small objects)
and geographical space (e.g., the space of countries or nations)
are too small or too large to be experienced through navigation,
the distinction between vista and environmental space is relevant
in the context of navigation: a vista space is the space that can
be visually apprehended from a single location or with only little
exploratory movements (see Figure 2). Typical examples for vista
spaces are single rooms or town squares such as the St. Peters
Square in Rome mentioned above. In contrast, environmental
spaces such as buildings, neighborhoods or towns cannot be
experienced from a single place or even from a certain part of
the environment but require considerable movement. Although
navigation paradigms that aim to investigate spatial reference
frames and the underlying neuronal representations have made
use of both vista and environmental spaces, the impact that
different spatial scales have on the ensuing spatial representation
and their reference frame are rarely considered.
Why does the scale of space matter? There are obvious dif-
ferences between navigating vista spaces and navigating envi-
ronmental spaces. First, navigating large environmental spaces
takes longer than navigating vista spaces and requires traversing
through several connected (vista) spaces. It therefore requires
integration of information over extended periods of time as well
as space and involves the planning of complex routes which may
feature a large number of decision points. Second, target locations
in environmental space are beyond the sensory horizon while they
lie within the sensory horizon in vista spaces. These differences
have important implications for the spatial representations and
the cognitive processes involved in navigation and will be dis-
cussed in more detail below.
The most commonly used navigation tasks in animal research
are all vista space paradigms. The Morris Water Maze (MWM),
the T-, Plus- or Y-maze are set up such that the entire environment
along with all the navigationally relevant cues and the target
destination can be perceived, either at all times or when making
movement decisions. Accordingly, the bulk of our knowledge
about the neuronal mechanisms involved in egocentric or allocen-
tric navigation that comes from electrophysiological and behav-
ioral neuroscience experiments in animals relates to navigation
in small scale vista spaces. While environmental scale spaces are
more commonly used in behavioral and brain imaging navigation
experiments in humans, the question of how behavioral and
neuronal mechanisms in vista and environmental scale spaces
relate has received very little attention. This is somewhat surpris-
ing, given that one may argue that navigation abilities and the
corresponding spatial representation have evolved to support nav-
igation in environmental spaces where—in contrast to vista scale
spaces—target destinations are not visible and cannot be reached
by a simple visual approach (discussed in more detail below).
FIGURE 2 | Vista spaces: the yellow polygon despicts the area of St
Peters square that is visible from the observer position (x). Note that
almost the entire space can be apprehended from a single position. While
visual barrieres such as the obelisk and the fountains will obstruct the view of
some of the space, only little exploratory movements are required to
apprehend the entire space. The visible area from any position is crucial for
defining the local vista spaces as well as connections between them (see
Franz and Wiener, 2008).
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How do representations of vista and environmental spaces relate?
In principle, there are two ways of representing environmental
scale spaces. First, the entire environment is represented in a single
reference frame; depending on the nature of this reference frame,
locations in the environment are either described as coordinates
relative to the origin of an allocentric coordinate system, relative
to other locations (allocentric), or as vectors relative to self in an
egocentric reference frame. Second, different parts of the environ-
ment are represented independently; in order to navigate environ-
ments successfully, these independent representations have to be
linked.
It is hard to imagine that our spatial knowledge about large
environments such as entire cities is represented in a single
reference frame: given an allocentric representation, where would
be the origin of the coordinate system (see also discussion
in Section Egocentric vs. Allocentric Reference System)?
Alternatively, given a purely egocentric reference frame, one
would need to constantly update egocentric vectors to all known
locations in the environment during navigation. There is also
empirical evidence challenging the idea that environmental spaces
are represented within a single reference frame. For example,
people automatically update object locations in their immediate
surrounding (vista space) while more remote parts of the
environment are not efficiently updated (Wang and Brockmole,
2003). Evidence for separate or fragmented representations also
comes from pointing experiments, demonstrating increased
accuracy for within-region as compared to between-region
direction judgements (Han and Becker, 2014). This suggests that
representations of environmental scale spaces are fragmented
into independent units. Similar conclusions have been drawn by
Meilinger et al. who demonstrated that different (vista) spaces
along a route were encoded using independent local reference
frames (Meilinger et al., 2014). A neuronal code for an egocentric
representation of vista spaces has been hypothezied by Byrne
et al. (2007): in their model, a population of posterior parietal
neurons—presumably located in the precuneus—represents
the locations of all landmarks and objects visible from the
current location or from a location that is recalled from previous
experience.
Further support for the idea of independent representations
or reference frames (Worden, 1992; Derdikman and Moser, 2010)
comes from animal experiments demonstrating that (i) the same
place cell may code for different locations in different envi-
ronments (e.g., Skaggs and McNaughton, 1998; Colgin et al.,
2008); and (ii) that entorhinal grid cells do not exhibit periodic
two dimensional firing fields covering the entire environments
in environments that are subdivided into multiple corridors,
but rather establish separate grid patterns for each corridor
(Derdikman et al., 2009).
How are these individual representations of smaller (vista
scale) spaces connected? Graph-like representations have long
been suggested to provide a structure suitable to integrate inde-
pendent, yet interconnected, memories of space (Kuipers, 1978;
Poucet, 1993; Schölkopf and Mallot, 1995). In addition, graphs
also allow for hierarchical spatial representations (Stevens and
Coupe, 1978; Wiener and Mallot, 2003; Han and Becker, 2014).
In graph-like structures, local positional information is usually
represented in nodes, while edges represent connections between
nodes (see Figure 3). Several graph models of environmental scale
spatial memory have been proposed in the animal and human
FIGURE 3 | Hierarchical graph-like representation of an environmental
scale space. Single places or vista scale spaces are represented as nodes,
connections between them are represented by edges. Graphs also allow to
represent hierarchical spatial knowledge, where several places are combined
to form regions. The spatial relationship between different regions is
represented at a higher level of abstraction (Wiener and Mallot, 2003).
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literature. The exact nature of the information stored in nodes
and edges differ between models: Poucet (1993), for example,
suggested that nodes are place representations, while connections
between distinct places are encoded in polar coordinates as
vectors. At a higher level of abstraction, the animal’s current
environment, which may contain any number of places that share
common stimulus properties, becomes a so-called local chart.
Note that the idea of a local chart is similar, if not identical,
to the concept of a vista space. According to Poucet (1993)
environmental scale spaces are represented in terms of multiple
local charts (vista spaces) and spatial relationships between them.
Closely related to this network of charts idea is the Network of
Reference Frames theory (Meilinger, 2008), which proposes that
environmental spaces are represented by means of interconnected
reference frames, i.e., independent coordinate systems each with a
specific orientation and representing a different vista space. These
reference frames or nodes are connected by edges which describe
the perspective shift—the translation and rotation—necessary to
move between them.
WHAT DOWE KNOW ABOUT THE NEURAL MECHANISMS
THAT SUPPORT NAVIGATIONAL BEHAVIOR?
NAVIGATION IN VISTA SCALE SPACES
Allocentric navigation in vista space
Ever since the discovery of place cells in the hippocampus of
freely moving rats (O’Keefe and Dostrovsky, 1971), the hip-
pocampus has been thought to provide an allocentric descrip-
tion of an environment, often referred to as a cognitive map.
Place cells fire whenever an animal moves through a certain
location, independent of its facing direction. Many experiments
have shown that both environmental boundaries and salient
landmarks placed outside the apparatus exert tight control over
the firing of place cells, suggesting that place cells are driven by
environmental objects located (i) in a certain allocentric direction
from the animal; and (ii) at a certain distance from the animal.
This distance sensitivity relative to the observer, however, makes
it impossible to determine whether place cells code for distance
in an egocentric or an allocentric reference frame, since both
are identical when the observer occupies one of the two points
between which distance is computed.
Electrophysiological recordings of place cells, however, can
only demonstrate a correlation between spatial position and the
firing behavior of neurons. To establish the causal role of the
hippocampus for allocentric navigation, numerous studies have
applied temporary or permanent lesions to the hippocampus.
By far the most popular paradigm used in these experiments
is the MWM (Figure 4), which is often referred to as the gold
standard for studying allocentric spatial learning or memory.
In the MWM, the animal has to find a platform submerged
in a pool of opaque water, a task that healthy animals learn
quickly even though the starting location is changed between
trials or sessions. In contrast, animals with hippocampal lesions
show marked impairments in the MWM as they take longer to
learn the location and tend to often search for the platform in
incorrect locations (Morris et al., 1982). However, when these
animals always begin the trial from the same position, they show
little to no impairment. Taken together, these findings suggest
that the hippocampus contributes only to allocentric spatial
learning, whereas egocentric navigation is independent of the
hippocampus.
While the results from these studies seem to tell a coherent
story about the navigational functions of the hippocampus, a
closer look reveals a number of problems and limitations. In the
FIGURE 4 | Spatial Coding in the Morris Water Maze; left: the animal has
found the platform and can encode the spatial relationship between the
platform and extra-maze cues as allocentric vectors. Note that while sitting
on the platform, allocentric and egocentric vectors to the landmarks only
differ with respect to their orientation, but not in their length; right: as the
entire environment can be perceived from any position in the pool, the
platform location can be computed by simply projecting the learned
allocentric vectors from the landmarks into the pool. As a consequence, the
animal does not need to know its current allocentric position to find the
submerged platform.
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MWM, the location of the goal—i.e., the position of the hidden
platform—can either be specified by an allocentric vector that
specifies the distance and direction from the origin of a coordinate
system or by multiple allocentric vectors between the platform
location and other objects in the environment. As discussed
above, it is unclear what would specify the origin of an overall
allocentric coordinate system in the MWM, hence it seems far
more likely that the allocentric representation involves vectors
between the platform location and external landmarks.
What is rarely appreciated is that the MWM only assesses
navigation in vista space. Specifically, no matter where the animal
is started on a given trial, the entire environment can always be
perceived with little or no movement (note that rodents have
a very large field of vision; even with a more restricted field
of vision, head movements are sufficient to perceive the entire
environment). In other words, all information required to calcu-
late the platform location is available from the animals current
location, and the platform location can therefore be computed
by simply projecting the allocentric vectors from the landmarks
into the pool (see Figure 4). As a consequence, the animal does
not need to know where it is located in the environment, since
the platform location can easily be computed by looking at the
landmarks. This lack of the need for self-localization also applies
to other popular vista space navigation tasks. For example, in the
T-, Y- or Plus Maze paradigms, the entire space is visible from
the central junction, hence direct approach behavior to the goal
without self-localization is possible.
Finally, and contrary to widely held assumptions, it is not
easy to identify the spatial reference frame used in vista space
navigation tasks. For example, in the control condition used
in many MWM studies, rats simply have to approach a visible
platform. Animals with hippocampal lesions perform well in this
version of the task, which is typically taken as evidence that the
hippocampus is specifically required for allocentric spatial mem-
ory. However, this control condition does not require any spatial
learning, because the goal is always visible. Similarly, studies
with humans with hippocampal lesions have employed egocentric
control conditions in which the platform location is marked by
a nearby beacon (Goodrich-Hunsaker et al., 2010), which does
not require the learning of an egocentric vector either. As a
consequence, the only conclusion that can be drawn from such
studies is that the hippocampus plays a role in forming spatial
memories, but it does not inform about the nature of the reference
system. To overcome this problem, some authors have employed
control conditions in which the platform continues to be sub-
merged but the animal is always started from the same location
(Eichenbaum et al., 1990), assuming that it now solves the task by
learning an egocentric vector from its starting location towards
the goal. Even this control condition is problematic because (i)
it is now unclear what information is used to reference the goal
location, because both extramaze landmarks and the animal’s
starting position could serve this purpose; and (ii) it is possible
that the task is generally easier when the animal is always released
from the same starting location. A solution to this problem would
involve a condition in which the animal is always started from a
different location—as in the allocentric condition—but the plat-
form is moved so that it remains in a constant egocentric relation
to the animal’s starting position. With this manipulation, both
egocentric and allocentric conditions would require the animal
to learn vectors, either relative to external room cues (allocentric)
or relative to its own position (egocentric).
While our discussion of allocentric navigation in vista space
has focussed on studies investigating spatial coding in the hip-
pocampus, the discovery of grid cells in entorhinal cortex (EC)
of rodents and primates shows that an allocentric code for an
organism’s position may already be computed upstream of the
hippocampus (Hafting et al., 2005; Killian et al., 2012; Jacobs
et al., 2013). While theoretical models assume that the main
function of the grid cell system consists of path integration—
the tracking of changes in spatial position based on incoming
self-motion cues—most studies on spatial coding in EC have
employed electrophysiological recordings in freely moving ani-
mals that were not engaged in any navigational task. In addi-
tion, lesions studies investigating the role of EC for allocentric
learning (i.e., in the MWM) have yielded mixed results (Burwell
et al., 2004; Steffenach et al., 2005). Given these findings and
the interpretational problems of the MWM and other vista space
navigation tasks as discussed above, it is difficult to ascertain the
navigational contribution of the grid cell system to vista space
navigation at present.
The role of boundaries and geometric layout
In rectangular arenas, rats often confuse diagonally opposite cor-
ners, even when differentiated by distinctive cues (Cheng, 1986).
This led to the claim that rats rely preferentially on the geometry
of space, encoded in a dedicated geometric module. Similar ideas
have been proposed for humans, even though they may combine
geometric cues with featural cues (i.e., landmarks) by means of
natural language (Wang and Spelke, 2002). While later studies
have cast doubt on the idea of a dedicated geometric module
in the mammalian brain (Cheng, 2008), behavioral work has
consistently shown that salient geometric cues such as the walls
of a room are often used to define allocentric reference directions
(Shelton and Mcnamara, 2001).
On the neuronal level, two cell types have been described that
may provide a neural substrate for the coding of geometric layout.
Border cells fire whenever the animal is at an environmental
boundary such as a wall of the recording arena (Solstad et al.,
2008). In addition, boundary vector cells, which have been found
in the subiculum, fire whenever the animal is located in a certain
distance and allocentric direction away from a boundary (Lever
et al., 2009). Importantly, given that hippocampal place cells
appear to function independently of the grid cell system (Brandon
et al., 2014), these boundary vector cells may provide the key
input that drives the localized firing of hippocampal place cells
(Bush et al., 2014).
In the context of our discussion of vista and environmental
space, it is important to note that virtually all behavioral and neu-
roscience experiments on geometry coding have been conducted
in vista space environments such as single rooms for humans
or regularly shaped boxes (i.e., rectangles) for rodents. In these
environments, salient geometric boundaries that define the layout
of a space can be seen from any vantage point, hence it makes
perfect sense that distance and direction to the boundaries are
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(i) explicitly coded in neuronal circuits; and (ii) used to organize
spatial representations and to reference the locations of external
objects and of the navigator. A major problem, however, arises
when we need to code for a location that lies beyond our sensory
horizon: in environmental spaces such as neighborhoods or dif-
ferent parts of a city, geometric cues that could be seen from any
vantage point are rarely available (note, of course, that there are
exceptions such as the extended cliff face of Edinburgh’s famous
Salisbury Crags that, due their elevated location, are visible from
most parts of the city). Rather, all one can see when wandering on
a typical street or square are the faces of the buildings in the local
surroundings, which disappear quickly upon turning into another
street. Geometric cues such as rivers or extended major roads,
which could be useful for coding locations in large scale space,
can often not be seen or, even if they are within one’s current
sensory horizon, only parts of them are visible. As a consequence,
environmental boundaries and boundary related coding appear
most useful for coding local positions in vista spaces such as the
location of a traffic light relative to the surrounding buildings, but
they are rarely available and useful in environmental scale spaces.
Egocentric navigation in vista space
Similar to allocentric navigation, animal studies on navigation
involving egocentric knowledge are predominantly carried out
in vista space environments. For example, in the MWM, lesions
to the striatum impair navigation towards a location marked
by a distinct visible landmark but not to an unmarked one
defined relative to distal landmarks and boundaries (Packard and
Mcgaugh, 1992; McDonald and White, 1994). Similarly, when a
location is defined by its distance and direction from an intramaze
landmark (given distal orienting cues), and not by the boundary
of the maze, hippocampal damage does not impair navigation
(Pearce et al., 1998) although lesions of the anterior thalamus
(with presumed disruption of the head-direction system) do
impair navigation (Wilton et al., 2001). These findings, which
are in accord with the results from fMRI experiments in humans
(Doeller et al., 2008), are generally taken as evidence for the
complementary roles of the hippocampus and the striatum for
spatial navigation, with the former defining locations relative
to the boundaries and extramaze landmarks in an allocentric
reference frame, while the latter defines locations relative to local
landmarks, and the head direction system is required to derive
the animal’s orientation from distant landmarks. A second type
of studies have consistently implicated the dorsal striatum, in par-
ticular the caudate, in learning habits and egocentrically defined
motor responses. For example, in the Plus Maze task, the response
strategy consists of always executing the same motor response at
the central junction (i.e., turn right), independent of the direction
from which this junction is approached. Inactivating the caudate
leads to a blocking of response learning and a preference for
a place strategy, whereas inactivating the hippocampus has the
opposite effect (Packard and Mcgaugh, 1992).
These complementary roles of the dorsal striatum: (i) coding
for object positions relative to local landmarks or beacons; and
(ii) defining an egocentric motor response, however, do not tap
into the process of coding egocentric knowledge as defined in
Figure 1. Rather, coding for object positions relative to local
landmarks involves an observer independent object-to-object vec-
tor that requires the retrieval of an allocentric reference direction.
In addition, learning to execute a specific motor response such as
“turn right” does not involve the learning of a metric egocentric
vector between the observer and a target object. All that is needed
is motor skill or habit learning in which a categorical motor
behavior such as “turn right”, which is not specified in terms of
a precise angle, is associated with obtaining a reward. In support
of this conceptualization, response learning in the Plus- or T-
maze is known to proceed slower than place learning (Packard and
Mcgaugh, 1992), supporting the notion that response learning
requires repeated reinforcement whereas place learning is a form
of rapid, incidental learning (Salmon and Butters, 1995).
Direct evidence for the coding of egocentric vectors towards
external objects in vista space comes from primate studies inves-
tigating the functions of the posterior parietal cortex. When
monkeys are presented with a visual or auditory target, neurons in
subdivisions of the posterior parietal cortex code for the object’s
location in multiple egocentric reference frames, for example eye-
centered, head-centered or trunk-centered (Colby, 1998). Such
locational cues form the basis of an egocentric map of the
surrounding space that critically depends on the precuneus and
connected inferior and superior parietal areas. Similar egocentric
representations have been documented in humans using fMRI
(Committeri et al., 2004; Schindler and Bartels, 2013), but it
is important to note that these studies are generally performed
with static observers. Egocentric navigation, however, involves a
dynamic updating of the egocentric object vectors as the observer
moves about an environment. This integration of self-motion
cues with existing egocentric representations appears to be medi-
ated by the precuneus (Wolbers et al., 2008; Jahn et al., 2012). It
is currently not clear, however, as to whether the precuneus also
provides egocentric codes for distant objects beyond the sensory
horizon—a key component of navigation in environmental scale
space. In addition, whether the role of the precuneus is restricted
to providing transient egocentric codes or whether it also stores
long-term memory traces of such codes is unknown.
NAVIGATION IN ENVIRONMENTAL SCALE SPACES
Navigation in environmental scale spaces can be based on allo-
centric or egocentric strategies (Wiener et al., 2013). Functional
brain imaging studies in humans have shown that the hip-
pocampal circuit is recruited when people employ strategies that
require allocentric processing, such as planning and navigating
novel routes through familiar environments (“wayfinding”). The
parietal cortex and striatal circuits, in contrast, are involved in
egocentric navigation strategies such as following a well-known
route (Hartley et al., 2003; Iaria et al., 2003; Wolbers et al., 2004;
Burgess, 2008). While these results seem to mirror the findings
of lesion and electrophysiological studies in animals in vista scale
space nicely (discussed above), it is important to consider the
impact that the scale of space has on the mechanisms involved
in navigation.
Allocentric navigation in environmental spaces
Wayfinding is the most commonly used allocentric navigation
task in environmental spaces (e.g., Wiener et al., 2004; Hölscher
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et al., 2011). Wayfinding in familiar environments such as cities,
neighborhoods or buildings involves planning novel routes to
destinations beyond the current sensory horizon (i.e., in a dif-
ferent vista space). During wayfinding, landmarks specifying the
goal location will not be available at the start of the navigation.
Thus, in contrast to allocentric navigation in vista spaces, the
goal location cannot be computed simply by looking at the
landmarks. Rather, computing a trajectory to the goal location
requires several steps. The first step involves localizing oneself
within the environment, a process that, as we discussed before,
is not required in vista scale space navigation. In a second
step, the goal needs to be localized. These first two steps can
be conceptualized as highlighting two locations in an internal
representation of space or cognitive map. Finally, the actual tra-
jectory from the current location to the goal has to be computed.
Importantly, this trajectory will rarely be a straight line as it is
in tasks such as the MWM. Instead, navigation in environmental
spaces often requires planning and following long paths with
several decision points. Simply choosing the path option most
aligned with the direction of the goal location does not neces-
sarily lead to the destination. This has important implications
for the underlying internal mental map; representations only
coding spatial relationships between landmarks or locations are
not sufficient. Wayfinding in environmental spaces also requires
knowledge about connections between places which is difficult—
if not impossible—to accomplish if all spatial knowledge is coded
in a single allocentric reference frame (i.e., in map like represen-
tations of space). As mentioned in Section Scales of Space, the
simplest structure to achieve this is a graph-like representation, in
which nodes represent places (or vista spaces) and edges refer to
the movements required to navigate between neighboring nodes.
In humans, functional brain imaging studies suggest that the
hippocampus is recruited during the learning of environmental
spaces (cognitive mapping) and when planning routes or short-
cuts through known environments: Wolbers and Büchel (2005)
trained participants on a long and complex route featuring several
places and landmarks and asked participants to judge the spatial
relations between these landmarks. Interestingly, hippocampal
activation did not follow overall performance but rather reflected
the amount of knowledge acquired in a given experimental ses-
sion, suggesting prominent hippocampal activation only during
early stages of cognitive mapping. Furthermore, hippocampal
activation is associated with planning routes through spatial but
not social (purely relational) networks (Kumaran and Maguire,
2005) as well as with the quality of the solution (Hartley et al.,
2003).
Although these studies demonstrate that the hippocampus is
involved in allocentric navigation in environmental spaces, they
do not reveal its precise role during wayfinding. As discussed
above, wayfinding requires localization of self and destination and
the planning of a route between these locations. Furthermore, the
route needs to be monitored during travel and further planning
en route is often required (Wiener and Mallot, 2003; Hölscher
et al., 2011). To isolate the neuronal mechanisms underlying
these processes, Spiers and Maguire had experienced London
Taxi drivers navigate through a virtual reality simulation of Lon-
don (Spiers and Maguire, 2007a,b). Using retrospective verbal
protocols, they isolated different cognitive processes involved in
wayfinding and related them to functional brain imaging data
recorded during the actual navigation. Neural activity associated
with route planning was not limited to the hippocampus, but
involved a network of different regions including retrosplenial
cortex and prefrontal cortex (PFC). Specifically, hippocampal
activation was most prominent during initial planning, suggesting
its primary role is to activate or retrieve the relevant spatial
information, and the retrosplenial cortex was most active during
planning and monitoring progress along the route. In addition,
PFC was involved in planning, monitoring, when expectations
are violated or when encountering unexpected roadblocks which
required replanning of the route. Finally, during navigation, the
spatial relationship between self and goal location was continu-
ously tracked by several brain regions. Medial prefrontal activity
correlated positively with beeline distance to the target; activity
in right subicular/enthorinal region correlated negatively with
target distance, and the posterior parietal cortex coded for the
egocentric direction to the target. The latter result is in line with
findings obtained in vista space paradigms, demonstrating that
the posterior parietal cortex represents spatial location relative to
a number of egocentric reference frames (Colby, 1998, see also
Section “Egocentric Navigation in Vista Space”).
Taken together, successful allocentric navigation in environ-
mental space involves a number of processes, including self local-
ization, the planning of complex routes, monitoring progress
along the route and further (re)planning, that are not necessary
when navigating vista spaces. As a consequence, research using
vista scale paradigms such as the MWM, the Plus- or T-maze
will only be able to identify a subset of the neuronal mechanisms
involved in environmental space navigation.
Learning unfamiliar environments
Another important difference between navigation in vista and
environmental scale spaces relates to the learning of the environ-
ment. To solve the allocentric version of the MWM task, for exam-
ple, subjects have to know the position of the hidden platform
relative to the environmental cues. Essentially this information
can be encoded after finding the platform either by taking a
snapshot of the sensory information which can be compared to
the sensory input during navigation to calculate goal direction
(Cartwright and Collet, 1983; Cheung et al., 2008), or by memo-
rizing the spatial relations (i.e., vectors) between self-location and
environmental landmarks. Learning environmental scale spaces
is different as information about the entire environment cannot
be acquired instantaneously, but is experienced over an extended
period of time during exploration. That is, information about dif-
ferent parts of the environment is experienced at different times
and has to be combined into an integrated representation of space.
Knowledge about spatial relations between different parts of the
environment comes from fundamental navigation mechanisms
such as path integration and spatial updating which inform about
the translation and rotations when navigating between places.
Egocentric navigation in environmental spaces
The prototypical egocentric navigation task in environmental
spaces is route navigation or route following. In humans, route
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knowledge is often conceptualized as a series of stimulus-response
(S-R) associations (Trullier et al., 1997): the recognition of a
place or landmark triggers a movement response that is coded
in an egocentric reference frame. In the so-called associative cue
strategy this response is explicitly directional (e.g., “Turn left at
the Gas Station”). In contrast, in the beacon strategy, the response
requires a movement or turn towards a landmark or beacon (e.g.,
“Turn towards the Gas Station”). Finally, route navigation can also
be supported by simply memorizing a series of direction changes
(“Left—Right—Right - ...”, Waller and Lippa, 2007), in particular
when the environment does not provide any salient landmarks.
Route learning studies in both real and virtual environ-
mental scale spaces demonstrated that objects located at deci-
sion points are more reliably remembered than those that were
located between decision points (Aginsky et al., 1997; Schinazi
and Epstein, 2010). When presented with isolated objects that
were encountered during route learning, neuronal activity in
the parahippocampal gyrus is modulated by the navigational
relevance of these objects, with strongest activation for objects
at decision points that serve as landmarks or associative cues
for route knowledge (Janzen and van Turennout, 2004; Janzen
and Weststeijn, 2007; Schinazi and Epstein, 2010). Moreover,
both behavioral and neural responses to the landmark-object are
modulated when primed by an adjacent landmark. Specifically,
faster behavioral responses and increased activation in the retro-
splenial complex (RSC) are associated with in-route vs. against-
route primes, suggesting that the RSC is involved in integrating
landmark and path information (Schinazi and Epstein, 2010).
These findings are in line with earlier studies, suggesting that
retrosplenial areas play an important role in the learning of spatial
relationships in large environmental spaces (Wolbers and Büchel,
2005). Electrophysiological findings in monkeys, demonstrating
that neurons in the medial parietal regions, analogous to the
human RSC, selectively respond to specific S-R associations, are
consistent with the idea that the RSC supports associative cue
based route learning (Sato et al., 2006).
Some early evidence using standard vista space paradigms such
as the T-maze suggest that allocentric strategies can be adopted
faster than egocentric response strategies (Tolman et al., 1946)
In environmental space, in contrast, parallel acquisition of ego-
centric and allocentric strategies has been shown in both animals
(Rondi-Reig et al., 2006) and humans (Iglói et al., 2009). It is likely
that differences in the strategy adopted between vista and envi-
ronmental spaces result from differences in egocentric navigation
strategies. Specifically, learning an egocentric response strategies
in vista space paradigms such as the T- or Plus-Maze involves only
a single response that is best described as a striatum-dependent
motor-skill or as habit learning which involves repeated rein-
forcement (Salmon and Butters, 1995). Egocentric navigation
in environmental space, in contrast, usually involve associative
components (“Turn right at the church”) as well as memory of a
series of movement decisions, the execution of which takes much
longer than a single vista space response. The learning of habitual
motor programmes that support egocentric navigation in vista
spaces may therefore be less suited for environmental scale space.
In contrast to the widely held view that the hippocam-
pus is involved in allocentric but not egocentric processing
during navigation (Byrne et al., 2007; Whitlock et al., 2008;
Banta Lavenex and Lavenex, 2009), a number of studies have
implicated the hippocampus in route learning. Barrash et al.
(2000), for example, demonstrated that patients with hippocam-
pal lesions showed impaired route learning performance. Marked
route learning impairments have also been demonstrated in
patients with Mild Cognitive Impairment (MCI) and early stage
Alzheimer’s Disease (Cushman et al., 2008; Pengas et al., 2010),
which are primarily characterized by neurodegenerative changes
in the medial temporal lobe (Whitwell et al., 2007). Further-
more, knock out mice lacking hippocampal CA1 NMDA recep-
tors are not only impaired in allocentric learning but also in
learning a sequence of self-movements (sequential-egocentric
learning: “left-right-left”; Rondi-Reig et al., 2006). Interestingly,
these knock out mice were not impaired in learning a single self-
movement (“turn left”) as required for T- or Plus-Maze vista
space paradigms, but only showed deficits in learning successive
body turns. These results are in line with findings implicating
the hippocampus in the learning of complex motor sequences
(Schendan et al., 2003; Gheysen et al., 2010).
Another explanation for the involvement of the hippocam-
pus in route learning comes from its role in episodic memory
(Eldridge et al., 2000; Burgess et al., 2002), because each travel
through an environment also represents an episode during which
different places (or vista spaces) are sequentially experienced.
Remembering such a route or episode requires associating places
that one has occupied with movement decisions. Indeed, evidence
from electrophysiological studies suggest that the hippocampal
code for positional information is modulated by past experiences.
For example, when rats navigate along more complex paths or
routes, firing rates of hippocampal place cells may vary in the
same location depending on where the animal has come from
(Frank et al., 2000; Wood et al., 2000).
CONCLUSION/SUMMARY
In this review we have highlighted a number of problems arising
in the study of the neuronal mechanisms supporting egocentric
and allocentric reference frames in navigation. First, and in con-
trast to egocentric reference frames, the nature of allocentric refer-
ence frames is somewhat ill defined. For example, any allocentric
reference frame requires an origin for its coordinate system. In
most environments, however, it is unclear where this origin would
lie and whether locations are encoded by means of allocentric
vectors relative to the origin of the coordinate system or by their
spatial relations to other locations. While some of this confusion
may be related to the term “allocentric” itself which implies that
the reference frame has a center, it results in different usage of
the term in the literature and the exact nature of the assumed
allocentric reference system often remains underspecified.
Second, to study the neuronal mechanisms involved in allo-
centric processing one ideally wants a purely allocentric navi-
gation task. However, all navigation paradigms have egocentric
components, as actual navigation requires information—such as
direction to the destination or direction of turn—in an egocen-
tric format when planning and executing body movements. In
allocentric navigation paradigms such as the MWM it is not easy
to clearly characterize the allocentric and egocentric components,
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which makes it more difficult to allocate neuronal activity to these
different reference frames.
Third, the egocentric conditions used in the prominent vista
space paradigms do not require the processing of egocentric
vectors and may therefore not constitute the best possible com-
parison to hippocampal-dependent allocentric conditions for
which the processing of object-to-object vectors is required. In
egocentric vista space navigation subjects need to associate bea-
cons with platform positions (MWM) or learn a motor response
(Plus Maze). The egocentric information that is learned in these
situation is categorical (next to, left, right) rather than metric
(vector) and solving these tasks involves habit or motor skill
learning to a much greater extend than allocentric versions of
the task.
Fourth, ultimately navigation is about reaching destinations
beyond the current sensory horizon, that is, it is about movement
in environmental space. The vast majority of animal studies
addressing the neuronal basis of navigation, however, have
employed small scale vista space paradigms. Our knowledge
about how results from these studies translate to navigation
in environmental scale spaces is limited. We have argued that
successful navigation in environmental space, both egocentric
and allocentric, involves a number of processes that are not
required in vista space navigation. Research using vista scale
paradigms will therefore only be able to identify a subset of the
neuronal mechanisms involved in everyday navigation. This is
demonstrated in findings implicating the hippocampus in route
learning in environmental scale spaces—the prototypical
egocentric task in environmental spaces. Such findings
challenge the notion that the hippocampal circuit is recruited
exclusively for allocentric navigation while the striatal circuit
is responsible for egocentric navigation and demonstrate that
future work needs to address the relationship between neuronal
mechanisms underlying navigation in vista and environmental
spaces.
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